Asynchronous events and complexs ystem state distributed across independent nodes makee xposure and diagnosis of flaws in distributed systems a challenge. The difficulties are exacerbated when the goal is to validate fault tolerance mechanisms that are activated only by the occurrence of errors, which are, by nature, rare. Va lidation of fault tolerance mechanisms is often done by injecting faults that emulate the actual faults and ''stress''t he functionality of the resilience mechanisms. Va lidation campaigns lasting days and involving thousands of fault injections are often necessary.W ep resent an infrastructure that combines virtualization and software-implemented fault injection to automate validation campaigns and support the analysis of the behavior of a distributed system under test. Virtualization enables: 1) aflexible fault injector capable of emulating a wide variety of faults, and 2) am echanism for autonomously recovering faulty nodes so that the campaign can continue running on a target system that is fully functional. As ac ase study we use this infrastructure to validate a Byzantine-fault-tolerant cluster manager.O ver 1280 hours of fault injections yielded the exposure of 11 unique flaws in the cluster manager.
Introduction
To maximize reliability and availability,distributed systems often employf ault tolerance mechanisms that allowt hem to continue to operate correctly despite hardware or software faults. The operation of these mechanisms cannot be validated by field testing since faults are so infrequent that fault tolerance mechanisms are rarely exercised. Instead, software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) is often used to verify system operation under a variety of fault scenarios at a greatly accelerated rate [10, 8] .
Using fault injection, validating distributed systems is still challenging since erroneous behavior may only manifest when a rare ordering of asynchronous events occurs or a specific distributed system state is reached. Hence, a flexible infrastructure for unattended execution of injection campaigns is necessary.T here are three key requirements from such an infrastructure: 1) it must allow stressing of corner cases, coordinated across multiple nodes, as well as lengthyrandomized testing;2)evenwhen running manyt housands of injections, it must ensure that the initial system state for each test is error-free ; 3) fault injections, system responses, and resource usage must be logged for off-line analysis.
This paper presents an infrastructure that meets the requirements above byc ombining SWIFI with system virtualization. Virtualization [17] is leveraged to allow campaigns to continue autonomously following failures in the system under test, reduce the hardware resources required for testing, and facilitate injection to the OS kernels of system nodes [12] . The infrastructure is optimized for validating closely-coupled distributed systems (clusters). As part of this work, we present a detailed case study of using the infrastructure to validate a Byzantine-fault-tolerant cluster manager,i ncluding discovery of several critical flaws. Our results demonstrate the critical importance of the flexibility and autonomous operation provided by our infrastructure.
The use of fault injection to test distributed systems [19, 7, 8, 6] and leveraging virtualization for fault injection [2, 3, 18, 16, 9, 12] have been presented in previous works. However, unique features of our work include: A) a comprehensive presentation of all aspects of a practical testing infrastructure, and B) ad etailed case study of the use of the infrastructure to validate a system with multiple advanced fault tolerance features.
Section 2 describes the validation infrastructure based on system-levelv irtualization. A case study of the use of this infrastructure to validate a Byzantine-fault-tolerant cluster manager is presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present, respectively,related work and our conclusions. system instances. This may be impractical in many environments if each distributed system is actually composed of multiple physical computers. This issue provides part of the motivation for using system-level virtualization technology to run multiple nodes of the distributed system under test on a single physical computer. In particular,f or the experiments we report here, the entire distributed system is consolidated on a single physical host.
Virtualization technology allocates a computer's resources, such as CPUs and I/O devices, to multiple virtual machines (VMs). Each node of the distributed system runs as a VM, and each VM runs its own OS and user-levels oftware. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) enforces isolation among the VMs so that the activities of one VM do not affect other VMs. We use the Xen VMM [1] , which givesd irect access to the physical computer'sh ardware devices to one privileged VM. The privileged VM can start, halt, or shut down unprivileged VMs. It also hosts disk images for the virtual disks in each unprivileged VM and routes the network traffica mong the VMs and with other computers outside the virtualized environment.
In addition to reducing the required hardware resources, running nodes in VMs provides three main benefits overu sing physical machines. First, it enables implementing fault injection software partially or completely outside of the VM, minimizing intrusion on the system under test. Second, nodes implemented as VMs can be easily and quickly power-reset without specialized hardware. Finally,the virtualized environment can provide al ightweight communication facility among VMs through shared memory that can be used for coordinating fault injections and for logging system responses.
Fault Injection in a Virtualized Environment
To beuseful, a fault injector must be flexible in the types of faults that can be injected, the times at which faults can be injected, and the targets where faults can be injected. We have dev eloped Gigan [12] , a flexible SWIFI capable of injecting a variety of faults into OS kernels and user-level processes. Gigan can operate in non-virtualized systems buta lso has capabilities optimized for virtualized systems. Gigan 's operation is based on triggers and actions. Triggers are set to fire after some threshold has been reached or some event has occurred in the target machine. Triggers can fire based on timers, instruction breakpoints, process creation/termination, and performance monitoring ev ents (e.g., CPU cycle count) [4] . Associated with each trigger is a set of one or more actions to be performed at the time the trigger is fired. Tom aximize flexibility,a n action either injects a fault or sets another trigger.
The purpose of a fault injection campaign is to validate system operation under some well-defined fault model. For example, the goal may be to validate correct operation as long as, within a period of T seconds, no more than k nodes in the system operate erroneously.H ence, for ap articular experiment, the injector must not inject Gigan implements twoa pproaches to fault injection: the VMM-leveli njector ( Figure 1) and the OS-level injector (Figure 2 With anyf ault injection, it is desirable to minimize intrusiveness,i .e., minimize the impact of the fault injection on the behavior of the target system. The VMMleveli njector can operate without anyk nowledge of the internal structure of a VM running as a node in the system under test. Furthermore, it does not require anychanges to such VMs and has essentially no impact on their normal operation. However, treating the VM as a ''black box'' does not allowtargeting specific user-levelprocesses or OS data structures within the VM. The only exception to this opacity is that the Fault Injector can distinguish between the VM'se xecution of processes and OS-levelc ode. This exception is due to the fact that the VM OS runs in a higher hardware privilege levelt han the user-levelp rocesses, and the act of switching privilege levels is visible to the VMM. The VMM-levelinjector can use this visibility to target the VM OS by injecting faults only when the CPU is executing at the higher privilege level.
To target user-levelp rocesses, a VMM-leveli njector would need to be able read and parse data structures of the guest OS, such as process tables. Rather than add such complexity and OS dependencytothe VMM-levelinjector, Gigan implements a second approach to fault targeting, the OS-levelinjector ( Figure 2 OS-levelF IA gents must be coordinated so that fault injections into the target VMs occur as specified by the fault injection campaign. With Gigan 's OS-levelF I Agents, coordination is based on synchronized clocks and network communication. The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to keep the wall clocks of the VMs synchronized. In some cases, the FI Agents on the different VMs are assigned different time slots during which theyc an perform injection. In addition, the Campaign Agent can command FI Agents to pause or resume injection using user-levels ignals sent via SSH connections. The virtualized environment does enable an alternative method of coordination with potentially lower intrusion: processes on different VMs can communicate using memory pages that are shared among VMs. We chose to use time for coordination overt he lower-intrusion shared memory design for twor easons. First, NTP and user-levels ignals use very fews ystem resources such that the gain of evenl ower intrusion does not justify the added complexity of sharing memory between VMs. Second, the OS-levelF Ia gents as designed are portable to a validation infrastructure that uses physical machines instead of VMs.
Injection Campaign Management
In order to be able to interpret the results of the injection campaign and use them to correct flaws in the system, each experiment (injection) must be performed starting with a fault-free system. Specifically,l atent erroneous state from one injection must not be allowed to ''contaminate''t he results of the next injection. Thus, in order to maximize the speed of an injection campaign, the validation infrastructure should restore the system to a fault-free state as quickly as possible.
Using SWIFI, the hardware of the system under test cannot be permanently affected. Hence, areboot (or power reset) of a node removesa ny faulty state in volatile memory (CPU registers and memory). Forad istributed system running on physical machines, issuing a reboot command from within the faulty node may not work because the node could be crashed or hung. Using VMs instead of physical machines enables ''power-cycling''t he nodes without the use of special hardware (e.g. Intelligent Platform Management Interface).
Power-resetting a VM is not sufficient to repair a faulty node because fault injections can cause a node to write erroneous data to disk. The validation infrastructure must isolate and remove such erroneous disk state between experiments. Furthermore, erroneous disk state may need to be savedf or later analysis to assist in debugging the tested system. Ap ossible way to meet these requirements is to move the VM'so ld disk image to a safe location and makeacopyofa' 'golden''uncorrupted disk image for the VM'snew disk image. Since VM disk images can be quite large (hundreds of MB), copying an entire disk image would introduce long delays between experiments.
To reduce the delay of restoring disk state, the validation infrastructure uses a union mount inside each VM [15] . Fore ach unprivileged VM, the privileged VM hosts twod isk images: a read-only image containing the unprivileged VM'sroot file system, and a read-write image for the union mount'sbranch file system. The union mount of the root and branch file systems is performed by the guest OS at boot time. Subsequently,a ll writes to the root file system are redirected by the guest OS to the branch file system. After halting an unprivileged VM, the Campaign Agent movest he image containing the branch file system to another directory for storage and later analysis, and a newe mpty image is copied in its place. The Campaign Agent then commands the VMM to power-reset the unprivileged VM.
The use of union mount involves guest OS support and is thus somewhat intrusive.H owev er, the benefit gained by this intrusion is a significant reduction in the time spent restoring disk state before booting a VM. This is due to the fact that the size of the branch file system can be small relative tot he size of the root file system. For example, with our case study system (Section 3), the size of the root file system of each node was 2.5GB while the size of the branch file system was limited to 50MB. Copying the 2.5GB image took up to one minute, while copying the 50 MB image took at most one second.
Logging forPostmortem Analysis
Ak ey goal of anyf ault injection campaign is to identify and correct flaws in the system'sf ault tolerance mechanisms. In support of this goal, the infrastructure must provide a mechanism for collecting detailed functional and timing information regarding the actions of the injector as well as the resulting actions of all the components of the system under test. As diagnosis of a flawo ften requires focusing the information collected to particular components of the system, this mechanism must be configurable to easily include or exclude a variety of information sources.
To meet the above requirements, our validation infrastructure records timestamped information logged by three components: the location of fault injections, logged by the fault injector; information related to detection of and recovery from errors, logged by user-levelp rocesses running on the nodes (VMs) of the system under test; and, for each node of the system under test, usage of CPU cycles and memory of all the processes, as well as process creation and termination events, logged by a system resource monitor running as a user-levelp rocess on each node. The node resource monitor is useful for diagnosing problems such as hung processes and memory leaks.
Each VM runs a user-level logc lient process which receivesl ogs from various processes on that node via named pipes and sends them overt he network to the log server on a remote physical machine. The logs erver writes the logs to its local file system for later analysis.
There is a possibility that the resource monitor and logging activities on each node will impact the operation of the system (undesirable intrusiveness). With virtualization, less intrusive resource monitoring could be implemented from the VMM. This would require significant additional complexity in the VMM -an ability to access and parse internal data structures of the OS kernel of the VMs. Additionally,instead of using logclients to transmit logs to the logs erver, virtualization could be exploited for lower intrusion by using shared memory pages between each of the unprivileged VMs and the privileged VM. During the design and later experimentation with our infrastructure we determined that, for our purposes, the intrusiveness of the implemented mechanisms was negligible and did not justify the added complexity of the alternative implementations. Furthermore, the present resource monitoring and logging mechanisms are portable to a distributed system running on physical machines.
Validation of the Ghidrah CMM
As a case study,w eu sed our validation infrastructure with Ghidrah,af ault-tolerant cluster manager,d ev eloped at UCLA [13, 14] . Cluster management middleware (CMM) performs functions that are critical to the operation of a cluster,i ncluding allocating resources to user tasks, scheduling tasks, reporting task status, and coordinating fault handling for tasks. Since failure of the CMM causes the entire cluster to fail, the CMM must be highly faulttolerant. This section describes the use of our infrastructure to validate the fault tolerance mechanisms of the Ghidrah CMM.
To facilitate understanding of the fault injection campaigns we employed, we present a brief overviewo f Ghidrah 's system architecture and its error detection and recovery mechanisms. Following this, we describe the fault injection campaigns and the results of fault injections. Figure3 : The logical structure of the Ghidrah faulttolerant cluster management middleware.
Overview of Ghidrah System Architecture
With the goal of deployment for data processing in space, the Ghidrah CMM includes aggressive fault tolerance capabilities [13, 14] . The overall structure of Ghidrah is shown in Figure 3 . The system consists of four components: a replicated centralized manager,a na gent on each node, a library for user applications, and a ''trusted computer''c alled the Spacecraft Control Computer (SCC).
Ghidrah supports running multiple parallel applications with gang scheduling; in Figure 3 the circles represent processes of three user tasks labeled T1, T2, and T3. The ManagerG roup performs cluster-leveld ecision making, such as scheduling and fault management. An agent on each node reports node status to the ManagerG roup, performs commands at the node on behalf of the Manager Group, and provides an interface between application processes and the CMM. The user-levell ibrary,l inked with every user application, provides the mechanisms for setting up intra-task communication and includes an implementation of the Message Passing Interface (MPI) for user applications. The CMM design and implementation is focused on maintaining the basic cluster functionality despite anys ingle faulty node. The minimum ''basic cluster functionality''that must be maintained is the ability to submit newt asks, to continue the execution of tasks on operational nodes, and to maintain overall scheduling and monitoring of the system. The most critical part of the Ghidrah CMM is the centralized manager.H ence, the manager employs active replication [13] across three processes (ManagerR eplicas, or simply Replicas)r unning on different nodes. Each manager operation is performed independently on each of the ManagerR eplicas. Messages exchanged among Replicas, and between Replicas and agents are authenticated (signed [11] ) to ensure that faulty nodes cannot forge messages from other nodes, eveni ft he message is forwarded by the faulty node.
Agents act only when receiving identical authenticated commands from at least two ManagerR eplicas. Hence, a Replica that stops or generates incorrect commands cannot corrupt the system. If any Replica or agent suspects an error in a Replica, am essage is sent to all Replicas to initiate a self-diagnosis procedure.S elf-diagnosis consists Table 1 : Descriptions of fault injection campaigns and their results. The campaign name indicates the injection target and fault type: the first letter is the target, P for user-level process or K for OS kernel; the second letter is the fault type: f for bit-flip or t for process termination. *Target node selection changed only after the target node is powerreset. †Some flaws were exposed by multiple campaigns. The SCC controls the entire spacecraft, including handling communication between the cluster and its human operators on Earth. Loss of the SCC implies loss of the spacecraft. Hence, while the entire cluster is built using commercial-off-the-shelf technology,t he SCC uses radiation-hard technology and other aggressive fault tolerance techniques to ensure the survivalo ft he spacecraft. The design of the CMM must takeinto account the need to interact with the SCC and can takeadvantage of the existence of this ''hard core. '' Howev er, the SCC is not designed for high performance and must not be burdened with routine operation of the cluster.
Campaign Description Campaign Results

Injection target
Ghidrah takes advantage of the SCC by relying on its ability to power-reset the nodes of the cluster.T he ManagerG roup commands the SCC to power-reset a node if it stops receiving heartbeats from the node's Agent.T he ManagerG roup also sends periodic heartbeats to the SCC and a report each time the self-diagnosis procedure is initiated. If the SCC stops receiving consistent heartbeats from at least two ManagerR eplicas,i tp ower-resets all of the cluster nodes (i.e. resets the entire cluster). It is possible that failure of the self-diagnosis procedure will cause Replicas to erroneously initiate newr ounds of selfdiagnosis repeatedly.T he SCC maintains a record of recent self-diagnosis initiations and triggers a reset of the entire cluster if the number of self-diagnosis initiations overaspecified period of time exceeds a fixed threshold.
Experimental Setup
We ran the Xen VMM on a dual-socket quad-core Intel Xeon system (a total of eight cores). Ac luster of four nodes was run in the virtualized system. The SCC ran on a separate physical computer; this computer also used a log client to send SCC logs to the log server described in Subsection 2.4. Instead of directly performing powerresets of cluster nodes, the SCC logged such actions. The logs were then read and acted upon by the Campaign Agent running on the privileged VM.
Fault Injection Campaign Design
A fault injection campaign is a set of fault injections that have common properties, such as fault injection type, target, and timing. After an injection is performed, the system under test is allowed to run for a defined period of time to observew hether the injected fault caused an error, whether the error was detected by the system, and whether the system recovered from the detected error.T he campaign may also direct when and howt he system is to be restored to fault-free conditions in preparation for subsequent injections.
To validate Ghidrah and its fault tolerance mechanisms we designed three kinds of fault injection campaigns: 1) general campaigns that injected faults with minimal regard to the design of Ghidrah,2 ) Ghidrahspecific campaigns that injected faults based on the design of Ghidrah,a nd 3) flaw-specific campaigns that injected faults designed to reproduce conditions known to activate flaws that were exposed by the first twok inds of campaigns. Table 1 summarizes all of the campaigns. The general campaigns were useful in exposing a number of flaws in the Ghidrah CMM. Because the Ghidrah-specific campaigns used injections specific to the design of Ghidrah,t heyw ere able to expose more flaws that were very unlikely to be exposed by the general campaigns. Manyo ft hese flaws were exposed only after tens of hours of fault injections.
Fort he campaigns involving bit flips, the injected fault was a single bit flip into a randomly selected general purpose register of the x86 architecture. The selection of the bit of the register to flip was also random. Single bit flips were used because theyh av e been shown to best capture the effect of hardware transient faults caused by particle strikes to the system [5] . Since x86 processors have relatively fewr egisters, each of these registers is frequently used. Hence, a large fraction of faults injected into registers are manifested as errors. Thus, fault injection into registers resulted in accelerated stressing of Ghidrah 's fault tolerance mechanisms. Fault injection into memory wasn ot performed because memory corruption has been shown to have a low error manifestation rate [12, 18] .
The timing of fault injections was varied in order to introduce errors at different points of execution of the system. For each campaign, time was divided into periodic slots (see Table 1 ), with one injection performed per time slot. The injection trigger was scheduled to fire after a random interval from the beginning of the time slot up to half of the time slot duration. Fori njections of bit flips in registers that targeted a specific process or the OS kernel, the action for the time-based trigger was not the actual injection. Instead, the action was to set a second trigger to fire after a randomly-selected number of instructions, up to 5000 instructions, were executed by the target process or OS kernel. The second trigger'sa ction was to perform the bit flip.
In all of the campaigns, the Campaign Agent read the SCC log so that it could power-reset nodes on behalf of the SCC. Ghidrah wasd esigned to handle only a single node failure within the time it takes to detect and recoverf rom such failure. Hence, as discussed in Subsection 2.2, the injection infrastructure had to refrain from additional injections while the node reset was in progress. Therefore, the Campaign Agent paused all fault injection during an SCC-requested node power-reset.
None of the campaigns prevented faulty state in the target node from being propagated to fault-free nodes (e.g. via a corrupt message sent to a fault-free node). However, Ghidrah wasd esigned to detect and handle messages with corrupt payloads. Thus, it was not surprising that our experiments did not expose anyf ault propagation to faultfree nodes. Separate work in [14] performed fault injections on message payloads to validate Ghidrah 's faulttolerant communication protocols.
General Campaigns
There were twogeneral campaigns: Campaign 1Pf used the OS-leveli njector to target CMM processes; Campaign 2Kf used the VMM-leveli njector to target the guest OS. As discussed in Subsection 2.3, a node would ideally be rebooted after each injection in order to ensure a fault-free state before the next injection. However, ino rder to accelerate the experiments, this was not done with these campaigns. This shortcut had the potential to produce incorrect results -failure of the system under test due to a latent error from a previous injection coupled with the current injection manifesting as twos imultaneous node failures. In our runs of Campaigns 1Pf and 2Kf, this circumstance did not occur because faulty state either caused an immediate error or was overwritten before an error could be caused.
Campaign 3Kf was designed to decrease the possibility of simultaneous errors in multiple nodes while, at the same time, accelerating fault injections into the guest OS. In Campaign 3Kf, a target node was randomly selected, and it remained the target until it failed in such a wayt hat the SCC requested it to be power-reset. Subsequently,an ew target node was selected for the next injections. Thus, as ingle node could be targeted for multiple injections without clearing faulty state between injections, but at no time was there more than one node subject to fault injection.
Ghidrah-Specific Campaigns
These campaigns stressed Ghidrah based on knowledge of its design. Campaign 4Pf injected bit-flip faults as Campaign 1Pf, except that in each time slot an injection wasp erformed in twor andomly selected CMM processes on a single target node. LikeC ampaign 1Pf, targeted processes were not terminated after each fault injection experiment to remove faulty state. In some cases, this did cause a fault injected in one time slot to be manifested as an error in a later time slot. When this impacted two ManagerR eplicas simultaneously, Ghidrah responded correctly,with the SCC resetting the entire cluster.
Demonstrating the flexibility of the infrastructure, Campaign 5Pf was a modification of 4Pf that eliminated the incorrect propagation of the effects of one injection to the following injection, without requiring a timeconsuming node reboot. 5Pf was similar to 4Pf except that the targeted processes were explicitly terminated near the end of the time slot. Ghidrah detected the terminated processes and automatically started newp rocesses to replace them. Thus, the system was quickly restored to a fault-free state by the time the next time slot began.
Campaign 6Kf stressed Ghidrah 's replica recovery procedure by attempting to cause the starting of a new Replica to fail. In this campaign, a bit-flip fault was injected into the OS of a node not running a Replica.T his could crash or hang the node or potentially introduce latent erroneous state in the node. In the case where the target Flaw11c
Figure4 : Run-times of the campaign runs that exposed flaws. Each marker is labeled with the campaign name.
node did not hang or crash in the 15 seconds following the injection, the campaign caused the system to attempt to move a Replica to the target node. This was done by terminating a Replica process on another randomlyselected node, forcing the ManagerG roup to attempt to start a new Replica on the target node. If the target node failed to start the Replica, the ManagerG roup was expected to attempt to start a new Replica on another node.
Flaw-Specific Campaigns
The general and Ghidrah-specific campaigns exposed a number of flaws that were activated by CMM processes crashing. Campaigns 7Pt and 8Pt were designed to quickly reproduce these flaws by explicitly terminating CMM processes. Campaign 7Pt'si njection was to terminate the Replica on the target node; Campaign 8Pt'si njection was to terminate the Agent and Agent-Keeper.
Results
The results of the campaign runs are summarized in the right half of Table 1 . Of the 43,607 fault injections that caused errors, 37 exposed a total of 11 unique flaws in Ghidrah.T oq ualitatively illustrate the number of injections required to expose these flaws, we define the concept of a campaign run as a sequence of injections beginning with the cluster starting with all nodes powering up and ending with the exposure of the flaw. The 37 flaw exposures are plotted in Figure 4against the duration of the campaign run in hours. The large variability in the campaign run times are due to the randomness of injections, demonstrating the necessity of manyi njections. The figure also illustrates the need for varied fault types in order to coverthe various parts of the system. Flaws 1f, 2c, and 3c resulted in race conditions between normal timer events in the ManagerG roup and local events occurring in individual Replicas during the self-diagnosis and replica recovery procedures. Therefore, the campaigns that caused a Replica to fail were more likely to expose these flaws. After these flaws were exposed by the Ghidrah-specific campaigns, Campaign 7Pt wasd esigned to re-expose these flaws for debugging purposes. The first run of Campaign 7Pt ended with exposure of Flaw1 fi nl ess than 15 minutes. The remaining 63 hours of Campaign 7Pt runs were performed after Flaws 1f, 2c, and 3c were fixed.
The Ghidrah implementation failed to takei nto account the fact that a halted Agent does not mean that all the other processes on that node have halted. Flaws 4c, 5c, and 6a resulted in Ghidrah processes improperly handling messages from a Replica on a node whose Agent and Agent-Keeper had terminated. With flaws 4c and 5c, this led to Replica crashes. Flaws 7f, 8c, 9a, and 10a resulted in errors in handling unexpected orderings of messages or ev ents when CMM processes terminated or were restarted. It should be noted that these flaws were exposed by different sets of campaigns across a wide range of campaign run-times.
Flaw1 1c was unique among the 11 flaws because it wase xposed primarily by injection into the OS in Campaign 2Kf. Fault injection caused the Replica on the target node to stop sending heartbeats to the other Replicas butt oo therwise operate normally.T his caused the other Replicas to repeatedly initiate self-diagnosis due to the missing heartbeats and to neverd etect an inconsistencyi n the replicated state of the Replicas.T his flawdemonstrated the utility of injections targeting the OS evenwhen the goal is to expose flaws in user-levelprograms.
Of all the components of the validation infrastructure, the logging mechanism had potentially the highest intrusion and performance overhead, depending on how much data was logged by the tested system. Form ost campaign runs, we ran the Ghidrah CMM with detailed logging enabled to facilitate debugging. During these runs, the four nodes combined logged an average of 5.8KB/s.
The system logged more data while error detection and recovery procedures were being executed. Injections that caused errors resulted in bursts of logging activity,l asting up to 30ms, with a peak rate of 58KB/s.
Related Work
Fault injection has been used for validating fault tolerance mechanisms for overf our decades. ManyS WIFI tools target distributed systems [19, 7, 8, 6 ] butd on ot use virtualization. Such tools do not, by themselves, provide a solution to the problem of unattended operation of campaigns that require node reboots. In [6] , faults injected into the distributed system are coordinated based on a partial viewo ft he global state of the system. This approach requires instrumentation of the target system to notify the fault injector of the system'ss tate transitions. DOCTOR [8] and NFTAPE [19] are flexible SWIFI tools that use multiple trigger types and fault types for injection into distributed systems.
Virtualization has been used by others for fault injection. This includes tools for single-node systems, where the Linux kernel and applications run inside a single user-levelLinux process [2, 3, 18] . In [16] , fault injection is performed using a software-implemented emulator of PC hardware. This tool is also focused on single-CPU systems.
In [9] an infrastructure using virtualization is used to evaluate a fault-tolerant overlay network for implementing distributed hash tables. The faults injected included terminating user-levelp rocesses and halting VMs. Their methodology and focus most closely resemble our work.
Conclusion
It is well understood that validating fault-tolerance properties of complexdistributed systems is a difficult task because flaws may remain hidden until a rare confluence of asynchronous events occurs. The flexible validation infrastructure presented in this paper leverages both virtualization and SWIFI to efficiently validate complex distributed systems. It enables unattended, long duration, fault injection campaign runs, consisting of both randomized and tightly focused injections. The infrastructure provides the flexibility to easily design, implement, and execute multiple fault injection campaigns to quickly expose, reproduce, and diagnose flaws in the target system. The validation infrastructure was used in a case study to validate a Byzantine-fault-tolerant cluster manager.T he fault injection campaigns exposed several flaws and were instrumental in improving the reliability of the cluster manager.
